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Bargaining Over the Interference Channel
Amir Leshem and Ephraim Zehavi
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the interference channel as a conflict situation. This viewpoint implies that certain points
in the rate region are unreasonable to one of the players. Therefore these points cannot be considered achievable
based on game theoretic considerations. We then propose to use Nash bargaining solution as a tool that provides
preferred points on the boundary of the game theoretic rate region. We provide analysis for the 2x2 intereference
channel using the FDM achievable rate region. We also outline how to generalize our results to other achievable
rate regions for the interference channel as well as the multiple access channel.
Keywords: Spectrum optimization, distributed coordination, game theory, interference channel, multiple access
channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computing the capacity region of the interference channel is an open problem in information theory [1]. A good
overview of the results until 1985 is given by van der Meulen [2] and the references therein. The capacity region
of general interference case is not known yet. However, in the last forty five years of research some progress has
been made. Ahslswede [3], derived a general formula for the capacity region of a discrete memoryless Interference
Channel (IC) using a limiting expression which is computationally infeasible. Cheng, and Verdu [4] proved that the
limiting expression cannot be written in general by a single-letter formula and the restriction to Gaussian inputs
provides only an inner bound to the capacity region of the IC. The best known achievable region for the general
interference channel is due to Han and Kobayashi [5]. However the computation of the Han and Kobayashi formula
for a general discrete memoryless channel is in general too complex. Sason [7] describes certain improvement over
the Han Kobayashi rate region in certain cases. In this paper we focus on the 2x2 memoryless Gaussian interference
channel. A 2x2 Gaussian interference channel in standard form (after suitable normalization) is given by:
x = Hs+ n (1)
where
H =
[
1 α
β 1
]
s = [s1, s2]
T
, and x = [x1, x2]T are sampled values of the input and output signals, respectively. The noise vector
n represents the additive Gaussian noises with zero mean and unit variance. The powers of the input signals
are constrained to be less than P1, P2 respectively. The off-diagonal elements of H, α, β represent the degree of
interference present. The capacity region of the Gaussain interference channel with very strong interference (i.e.,
α ≥ 1 + P1, β ≥ 1 + P2 ) was found by Carleial given by
Ri ≤ log2(1 + Pi), i = 1, 2. (2)
This surprising result shows that very strong interference dose not reduces the capacity. A Gaussian interference
channel is said to have strong interference if min{α, β} > 1. Sato [6] derived an achievable capacity region (inner
bound) of Gaussian interference channel as intersection of two multiple access gaussian capacity regions embedded
in the interference channel. The achievable region is the subset of the rate pair of the rectangular region of the very
strong interference (1 2) and the region
R1 +R2 ≤ log2 (min {1 + P1 + αP2, 1 + P2 + βP1}) (3)
A recent progress for the case of Gaussian interference is described by Sason [7]. Sason derived an achievable rate
region based on a modified time- (or frequency-) division multiplexing approach which was originated by Sato for
School of Engineering, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel. Contact Author: Amir Leshem, e-mail: leshema@eng.biu.ac.il.
2the degraded Gaussian IC. The achievable rate region includes the rate region which is achieved by time/frequency
division multiplexing (TDM/ FDM), and it also includes the rate region which is obtained by time sharing between
the two rate pairs where one of the transmitters sends its data reliably at the maximal possible rate (i.e., the
maximum rate it can achieve in the absence of interference), and the other transmitter decreases its data rate to the
point where both receivers can reliably decode their messages.
In this paper we limit ourselves to the frequency-division multiplexing (FDM) scheme where an assignment of
disjoint portions of the frequency band to the several transmitters is made. This technique is widely used in practice
because simple filtering can be used at the receivers to eliminate interference. The results equivalently apply to
time-division multiplexing (TDM). In both cases we use the non-naive version, where all power is used in the
frequency/time slice allocated for a given user.
While information theoretical considerations allow all points in the rate region, we argue that the interference
channel is a conflict situation between the interfering links. Each link is considered a player in a general interference
game. As such it has been shown that non-cooperative solutions such as the iterative water-filling, which leads to
good solutions for the multiple access channel (MAC) and the broadcast channel [8] can be highly suboptimal in
interference channel scenarios [9], [10]. To solve this problem there are several possible approaches. One that has
gained popularity in recent years is through the use of competitive strategies in repeated games [11], [12]. Our
approach is significantly different and is based on general bargaining theory originally developed by Nash. We
claim that while all points on the boundary of the interference channel are achievable from the strict informational
point of view, most of them will never be achieved since one of the players will refuse to use coding strategies
leading to these points. The rates of interest are only rates that are higher than the rates that each user can achieve,
independently of the other user coding strategy. Such a rate pair must form a Nash equilibrium [13]. This implies
that not all the rates achievable from pure information theoretic point of view are indeed achievable from game
theoretic prespective. Hence we define the game theoretic rate region.
Definition 1.1: Let R be an achievable information theoretic rate region. The game theoretic rate region RG is
given by
RG = {(R1, R2) ∈ R : R
c
i ≤ Ri, i = 1, 2} (4)
where Rci is the rate achievable by user i in a non-cooperative interference game.
To see what are the pair rates that can be achieved by negotiation of the two users we resort to a well known
solution termed the Nash bargaining solution. In his seminal papers [14], [15], Nash proposed 4 axioms that a
solution to a bargaining problem should satisfy. He then proves that there exists a unique solution satisfying these
axioms. We will analyze the application of Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to the interference game, and show that
there exists a unique point on the boundary of the capacity region which is the solution to the bargaining problem
as posed by Nash.
The fact that the Nash solution can be computed independently by users, using only channel state information,
provides a good method for managing multi-user ad-hoc networks operating in an unregulated environment.
Due to space limitations the paper considers only the Gaussian interference channel and FDM strategy suitable
for medium interference [16]. However extensions to other achievable rate regions of the interference channels will
appear in a subsequent paper.
Application of Nash bargaining to OFDMA has been proposed by [17]. However in that paper the solution was
used only as a measure of fairness. Therefore Rci was not taken as the Nash equilibrium for the competitive game,
but an arbitrary Rmini . This can result in non-feasible problem, and the proposed algorithm might be unstable.
Furthermore our approach can be extended to other coding strategies such as in [7].
II. NASH EQUILIBRIUM VS. NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
In this section we describe to solution concepts for 2 players games. The first notion is that of Nash equilibrium.
The second is the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). In order to simplify the notation we specifically concentrate on
the Gaussian interference game.
A. The Gaussian interference game
In this section we define the Gaussian interference game, and provide some simplifications for dealing with
discrete frequencies. For a general background on non-cooperative games we refer the reader to [18] and [19].
3The Gaussian interference game was defined in [20]. In this paper we use the discrete approximation game. Let
f0 < · · · < fK be an increasing sequence of frequencies. Let Ik be the closed interval be given by Ik = [fk−1, fk].
We now define the approximate Gaussian interference game denoted by GI{I1,...,IK}.
Let the players 1, . . . , N operate over separate channels. Assume that the N channels have crosstalk coupling
functions hij(k). Assume that user i’th is allowed to transmit a total power of Pi. Each player can transmit a power
vector pi = (pi(1), . . . , pi(K)) ∈ [0, Pi]
K such that pi(k) is the power transmitted in the interval Ik. Therefore we
have
∑K
k=1 pi(k) = Pi. The equality follows from the fact that in non-cooperative scenario all users will use the
maximal power they can use. This implies that the set of power distributions for all users is a closed convex subset
of the cube
∏N
i=1[0, Pi]
K given by:
B =
N∏
i=1
Bi (5)
where Bi is the set of admissible power distributions for player i is
Bi = [0, Pi]K ∩
{
(p(1), . . . , p(K)) :
K∑
k=1
p(k) = Pi
}
(6)
Each player chooses a PSD pi = 〈pi(k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ N〉 ∈ Bi. Let the payoff for user i be given by:
Ci (p1, . . . ,pN ) =
K∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
|hi(k)|
2pi(k)∑
|hij(k)|2pj(k) + n(k)
)
(7)
where Ci is the capacity available to player i given power distributions p1, . . . ,pN , channel responses hi(f),
crosstalk coupling functions hij(k) and ni(k) > 0 is external noise present at the i’th channel receiver at frequency
k. In cases where ni(k) = 0 capacities might become infinite using FDM strategies, however this is non-physical
situation due to the receiver noise that is always present, even if small. Each Ci is continuous on all variables.
Definition 2.1: The Gaussian Interference game GI{I1,...,Ik} = {C,B} is the N players non-cooperative game
with payoff vector C =
(
C1, . . . , CN
)
where Ci are defined in (7) and B is the strategy set defined by (5).
The interference game is a special case of non-cooperative N-persons game.
B. Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative games
An important notion in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.2: An N -tuple of strategies 〈p1, . . . ,pN 〉 for players 1, . . . , N respectively is called a Nash equi-
librium iff for all n and for all p (p a strategy for player n)
Cn
(
p1, ...,pn−1,p,pn+1, . . . ,pN
)
< Cn (p1, ...,pN )
i.e., given that all other players i 6= n use strategies pi, player n best response is pn.
The proof of existence of Nash equilibrium in the general interference game follows from an easy adaptation of
the proof of the this result for convex games [21]. A much harder problem is the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
points in the water-filling game. This is very important to the stability of the waterfilling strategies. A first result in
this direction has been given in [22]. A more general analysis of the convergence (although it still does not cover
the case of arbitrary channels) has been given in [23].
C. Nash bargaining solution for the interference game
Nash equilibria are inevitable whenever non-cooperative zero sum game is played. However they can lead to
substantial loss to all players, compared to a cooperative strategy in the non-zero sum case, where players can
cooperate. Such a situation is called the prisoner’s dilemma. The main issue in this case is how to achieve the
cooperation in a stable manner and what rates can be achieved through cooperation.
In this section we present the Nash bargaining solution [14], [15]. The underlying structure for a Nash bargaining
in an N players game is a set of outcomes of the bargaining process S which is compact and convex. S can be
considered as a set of possible joint strategies or states, a designated disagreement outcome d (which represents
the agreement to disagree and solve the problem competitively) and a multiuser utility function U : S ∪{d}→RN .
4The Nash bargaining is a function F which assigns to each pair (S ∪ {d}, U) as above an element of S ∪ {d}.
Furthermore, the Nash solution is unique. In order to obtain the solution, Nash assumed four axioms:
Linearity. This means that if we perform the same linear transformation on the utilities of all players than the
solution is transformed accordingly.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. This axiom states that if the bargaining solution of a large game
T ∪ {d} is obtained in a small set S. Then the bargaining solution assigns the same solution to the smaller
game, i.e., The irrelevant alternatives in T\S do not affect the outcome of the bargaining.
Symmetry. If two players are identical than renaming them will not change the outcome and both will get the
same utility.
Pareto optimality. If s is the outcome of the bargaining then no other state t exists such that U(s) < U(t)
(coordinate wise).
A good discussion of these axioms can be found in [18]. Nash proved that there exists a unique solution to the
bargaining problem satisfying these 4 axioms. The solution is obtained by maximizing
s = arg max
s∈S∪{d}
N∏
n=1
(Ui(s)− Ui(d)) (8)
Typically one assumes that there exist at least one feasible s ∈ S such that U(d) < U(s) coordinatewise, but
otherwise we can assume that the bargaining solution is d. In our case the utility for user i is given by the rate Ri,
and Ui(d) is the competitive Nash equilibrium, obtained by iterative waterfilling for general ISI channels.
III. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION FOR THE TWO PLAYERS INTERFERENCE
GAME
In this section we outline the proof that a Nash bargaining solution always exists for utility function given by
capacity for any achievable rate region for the 2x2 interference channel.
An achievable rate region can always be defined by the following equations:
0 ≤ R1 ≤ R
1
max
0 ≤ R2 ≤ f(R1)
(9)
where f(R) is a monotonically decreasing concave function of R1. The monotonicity is obvious and the concavity
follows from a standard time sharing argument.
Theorem 3.1: Assume that we are given an achievable rate region for the interference channel described by (9).
Let Ui(R) = R be the utility of the i’th user, and let Rci be the achievable rate at the competitive Nash equilibrium
point for the i’th channel. Then there is a unique point
(
RNBS1 , R
NBS
2
)
that is the Nash bargaining solution using
the encoding strategies of the given achievable rate region for the interference channel. This point is Pareto optimal
and therefore on the boundary of the rate region, i.e., R2 = f(R1).
Note that by concavity f is strictly decreasing, except on an initial segment of rates for player I. Due to space
limitations, full proof of this theorem will be provided in an extended version of this paper. However the following
example provides the intuition underlying theorem 3.1, the relation between the competitive solution, the NBS and
the game theoretic rate region RG we have chosen SNR1 = 20 dB, SNR2 = 15 dB, and α = 0.4, β = 0.7. Figure
1 presents the FDM rate region, the Nash equilibrium point denoted by , and a contour plot of F (ρ). It can be
seen that the convexity of F (ρ) together with the concavity of the function defining the upper oundary of the rate
region implies that at there is a unique contour tangent to the rate region. The tangent point is the Nash bargaining
solution. We can see that the NBS achieves rates that are 1.6 and 4 times higher than the rates of the competitive
Nash equilibrium rates for player I and player II respectively. The game theoretic rate region is the intersection
of the information theoretic rate region with the quadrant above the dotted lines. Finally we comment that this
theorem can be generalized to N players with higher notational complexity.
IV. BARGAINING FOR THE TWO PLAYERS INTERFERENCE GAME
In this section we analyze the two players interference game, with TDM/FDM strategies. We provide conditions
under which the bargaining solution provides improvement over the competitive solution. This extends the work
of [9] where it is characterized when does FDM solution outperforms the competitive IWF solution for symmetric
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Fig. 1. FDM rate region (thick line), Nash equilibrium ∗, Nash bargaining solution and the contours of F (ρ). SNR1 = 20 dB, SNR2 = 15
dB, and α = 0.4, β = 0.7
2x2 interference game. We assume that the utility of player i is given by Ui = Ri, the achievable rate. To that end
lets consider the general 2x2 interference channel (in non-standard form). The received signal vector x is given by
x = Hs+ n (10)
where x = [x1, x2]T is the received signal,
H =
[
h11 h12
h21 h22
]
(11)
is the channel matrix and s = [s1, s2]T is the vector of transmited signals. Note that in our cases both transmission
and reception are performed independently, and the vector formulation is for notational simplicity only. Similarly
to the analysis of [9] the competitive strategies in the interference game are given by flat power allocation resulting
in rates:
Rc1 =
W
2 log2
(
1 + |h11|
2P1
WN0/2+|h12|2P2
)
Rc2 =
W
2 log2
(
1 + |h22|
2P2
WN0/2+|h21|2P1
) (12)
Dividing by the noise power WN0/2 we obtain
Rc1 =
W
2 log2
(
1 + SNR1
1+αSNR2
)
Rc2 =
W
2 log2
(
1 + SNR2
1+βSNR1
) (13)
where
SNRi = |hii|
2Pi
WN0/2
, α = |h12|
2
|h22|2
, β = |h21|
2
|h11|2
6This is equivalent ot the standard channel (1), with Pi = SNRi. Since the rates Rci are achieved by competitive
strategy, player i would not cooperate unless he will obtain a rate higher than Rci . Therefore the game theoretic
rate region is defined by pair rates higher that Rci of equation (13).
Since we are interested in FDM cooperative strategies assume that player I uses a fraction of 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 of the
band and user II uses a fraction 1− ρ. The rates obtained by the two users are given by
R1(ρ) =
ρW
2 log2
(
1 + SNR1ρ
)
R2(1− ρ) =
(1−ρ)W
2 log2
(
1 + SNR21−ρ
) (14)
The two users will benefit from FDM type of cooperation as long as
Rci ≤ Ri(ρi), i = 1, 2
ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ 1
(15)
For each 0 < x, y define f(x, y) as the minimal ρ that solves the equation(
1 +
x
ρ
)ρ
= 1 +
x
1 + y
(16)
Claim 4.1: f(x, y) is a well defined function for x, y ∈ R+.
Proof: Let
g(x, y, ρ) =
(
1 +
x
ρ
)ρ
− 1−
x
1 + y
For every x, y, g(x, y, ρ) is a continuous and monotonic function in ρ. Furthermore, for any 0 ≤ x, y, g(x, y, 1) > 0,
while
lim
ρ→0
g(x, y, ρ) < 0.
so there is a unique solution to (16).
Claim 4.2: Assume now that
f(SNR1, αSNR2) + f(SNR2, βSNR1) ≤ 1. (17)
Then an FDM Nash bargaining solution exists. The NBS is given by solving the problem
max
ρ
F (ρ) = max
ρ
(18)
where
F (ρ) = (R1(ρ)−R
c
1) (R2(1− ρ)−R
c
2) (19)
and Ri(ρ) are defined by (14).
Proof: Let ρ1 = f(SNR1, αSNR2), ρ2 = f(SNR2, βSNR1). By definition of f player i has the same rate as the
competitive rate if he can use a ρi, fraction of the bandwidth. Since (17) implies that ρ1+ρ2 ≤ 1 FDM is preferable
to the competitive solution.
A special case can now be derived:
Claim 4.3: Assume that SNR1 ≥ 12
(
α2β4
)−1/3
and SNR2 ≥ 12
(
β2α4
)−1/3
. Then there is a Nash bargaining
solution that is better than the competitive solution.
The proof of the claim follows directly by substituting ρ1 = ρ2 = 1/2.
We also provide without proof the asymptotic performance as SNRi increases to infinity
Claim 4.4: For each i and for any fixed z, limSNRi→∞ f(SNRi, z) = 0.
This implies that if one of the users has sufficiently high SNR than FDM strategy is preferable to competitive
strategy. This fact will be evident from the simulations in the next section.
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V. SIMULATIONS
In this section we compare in simulations the Bargaining solution to the competitive solution for various situations
with medium interference. We have tested the gain of the Nash bargaining solution relative to the Nash equilibrium
competitive rate pair as a function of channel coefficients as well as signal to noise ratio. To that end we define
the minimum relative improvement by:
∆min = min
{
RNBS1
Rc1
,
RNBS2
Rc2
}
(20)
and the sum rate improvement by
∆sum =
RNBS1 +R
NBS
2
Rc1 +R
c
2
(21)
In the first set of experiments we have fixed α, β and varied SNR1,SNR2 from 0 to 40 dB in steps of 0.25dB.
Figure 2 presents ∆min for an interference channel with α = β = 0.7. We can see that for high SNR we obtain
significant improvement. Figure 3 presents the relative sum rate improvement ∆sum for the same channel. We can
see that the achieved rates are 5.5 times those of the competitive solution. We have now studied the effect of the
interference coefficients on the Nash Bargaining solution. We have set the signal to additive white Gaussian noise
ratio for both users to 20 dB, and varied α and β between 0 and 1. Similarly to the previous case we present the
minimal improvement ∆min and the sum rate improvement ∆sum. The results are shown in figures 4,5.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have defined the game theoretic rate region for the interference channel. The region is a subset of
the rate region of the interference channel. We have shown that a specific point in the rate region given by the Nash
8Fig. 3. sum rate relative improvement. α = β = 0.7.
bargaining solution is better than other points in the context of bargaining theory. We have shown conditions for
the existence of such a point in the case of the FDM rate region. Finally we have demonstrated through simulations
the significant improvement of the cooperative solution over the competitive Nash equilibrium.
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